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SYNOPSIS: A building collapse is investigated in which a shallow trench, excavated along the length 
of the building, resulted in the building's collapse. An investigation indicated that the trench had 
been excavated within 1 ft (0.3 m) of the foundation and that the foundation had been constructed on 
approximately 7 ft (2.1 m) of soft silty clay with the bottom portion of this soil highly saturated. 
The bearing capacity of the foundation, prior to excavation, was estimated to have a safety factor as 
low as 1.5. As a result of the proximity of the trench to the foundation and the soft soils, the 
trench collapsed. soon after excavation. It is believed that the lower portion of the soil flowed into 
the tre~ch c~us~ng a loss . of be~ring capacity. An understanding of the geologic setting of the 
foundat~on so~ls, coupled w~th so~ls information from the USDA's Soil Conservation Service indicated 
the hazards of excavating in this soil. ' 
INTRODUCTION 
on July 16, 1989 a shallow trench was excavated 
along the length of a single-story building 
located in the city of Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The 
trench was being excavated for the installation of 
a sewer line to provide service to a rear portion 
of the building. The trench was approximately 3 
ft ( 0. 9 m) wide, starting from the southwest 
corner of the building and extending past the 
northwest corner of the building as shown in 
Figure 1. It was estimated that the trench was 
excavated to a depth of between 5 and 6 ft (1.5 
to 1.8 m). A majority of the excavation was 
completed in a four hour period by a single 
backhoe operator. The collapse of the building 
occurred approximately one hour after the operator 
completed the excavation and was on a break. 
Fortunately, no injuries resulted when the 
building collapsed into the trench. A majority of 
the west wall of the building rotated into the 
trench resulting in the collapse of the building's 
roof. 
Ensuing litigation resulted in the contractor in 
charge of the excavation being responsible for 
damages. Although the cause and effect 
relationship of the collapse appeared obvious, the 
extent and nature of the damage indicated that the 
foundation soils were in a relatively weak state 
prior to excavation. Consequently, a preliminary 
study was conducted to determine the factors that 
lead to the collapse of the building as well as 
ways of identifying such sites that may be 
susceptible to collapse from shallow trench 




The City of Tuscaloosa is located in the west-
central part of Alabama and has a population of 
approximately 75,000. The climate in Tuscaloosa 
is influenced by the Gulf of Mexico resulting in 
relatively warm humid summers accompanied by 
relatively mild winters. The average summer time 
temperature is 80°F 1 and the average winter time 
temperature is 46° F with an average annual 
precipitation of 52 in. The major physiographical 
feature of the area is the Black Warrior River 
Basin and the Black Warrior River. The Black 
Warrior River, which flows through Tuscaloosa, 
provides a major transportation link with the Gulf 
of Mexico and has two river lock systems within 
the corporate limits of Tuscaloosa. The city is 
located on the south bank of the Black Warrior 
River on a terrace approximately 50 to 75 ft (15 
to 23 m) above the river• s maintained level of 123 
ft MSL (37.5 m). Beyond the banks of the Black 
Warrior River, Tuscaloosa tends from relatively 
flat terrain in the West to relatively steep hills 
to the East. 
The collapsed building is located within a mixed 
residential/commercial section of Tuscaloosa in a 
southwest section of the city at the intersection 
of two streets as is shown in Figure 1. The 
building was used by an electrical contractor as 
both an office and warehouse at the time of the 
collapse. The area surrounding the building is 
characterized as a topographically low area but 
within a relatively flat section of Tuscaloosa. 
The building was of cinder block construction 
with conventional strip footings, which were 
placed at grade level. The exterior walls of the 
building were load bearing walls as well as a 
center wall constructed along the length of the 
building. The east part of the building, which is 
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·still in use as a storage building, has a 10 ft 
(3.0 m) high flat roof, while the west one half of 
the building was used as a warehouse with a 16 ft 
( 4. 9 m) roof. The remaining concrete floor on the 
west side of the building is now used as an 
outdoor storage area. The footings were measured 
at 16 in. (406 mm) in width and 18 in. (0.5 m) in 
depth, while the combined bearing loads on the 
footings were estimated to be 325 psf (16 kPa). 
It is believed that the building was built in the 
late 1940s or early 1950s. 
NORTH L t 
Parking Area 
Figure 1 Plan view of the collapse building site. 
GEOLOGIC CONDITIONS 
Geologically, Tuscaloosa is located on the "fall 
line" that separates the Southern Appalachian 
Mountains (Appalachian Plateau Province) and the 
northern Gulf of Mexico coastal plains (Coastal 
·Plain Province). The fall line is so named 
because it marks the area where river navigation 
from the Gulf of Mexico typically ends due to an 
increase in gradient of the rivers in Appalachian 
Mountain areas. In this region the Appalachian 
Plateau Province consists of relatively horizontal 
Paleozoic sedimentary rocks, while the Coastal 
Plain Province consists primarily of sedimentary 
Cretaceous materials overlain with younger 
Tertiary and Quaternary soils and rocks (Adams, et 
al., 1926). 
The surface geology of the Tuscaloosa area 
consists of a very young unconsolidated 
sedimentary layer believed to be of Pleistocene 
age and described locally as "terrace deposits". 
These terrace deposits are alluvial deposits from 
the nearby Black Warrior River and in the 
Tuscaloosa area lie unconformally on the 
Pottsville Formation of Lower Pennsylvanian age 
(Wielchowsky, 1975) •. These deposits are believed 
to have be~n deposited during the melting of the 
great continental ice sheets during the final 
phases of the last ice sheet (Wisconsin) some 10 
to 30 thousand years ago. The terrace deposits, 
which are 40 to 100 ft (12 to 30 m) thick in the 
Tuscaloosa area, are marked by coarse gravel at 
the bottom and become less gravelly and more sandy 
vertically until the upper layers are largely fine 
sand. The upper half is sandy in the lower part, 
yielding to red clayey soils nea~ the top •. T~e 
red clayey soils are characterist1c of later1t1c 




The field investigation consisted of a site 
investigation conducted within days of the 
collapse and a later investigation to obtain 
.samples for soil testing. During soil sampling, 
however, it was found that obtaining undisturbed 
soil samples from the site was difficult. The 
first difficulty was in obtaining undisturbed 
samples in close proximity to the excavation. As 
is shown in Figure 2, the building was located 
within 6 ft (1.8 m) of an adjacent property and is 
bounded by streets and a parking lot in the rear 
of the building. The soils in the region of the 
collapse were all highly disturbed due to the 
collapse and could not be adequately sampled. 
Consequently, soil samples were taken from the 
rear of the building in the parking area. Six 
auger holes were placed through the surface of the 
parking lot. The second difficulty encountered 
was that at about 40 in. (1 m) of depth very soft 
satura1;ed soils were encountered. While the soils 
~ere easily penetrated with a shelby tube, the 
saturated soil would not remain in the tube upon 
extraction. In fact, the auger hole itself did 
not stay open on account of the highly saturated 
soils. Undisturbed samples were, therefore, 
obtained only for the top 40 in. of the soil 
column. Auger holes were also placed in the area 
of the excavation to confirm the presence of the 
soft saturated soils. These auger holes also 
encountered very wet, saturated conditions with 
standing water at about 40 in. (1m). However, 
since the trench had considerable debris placed in 
it after the collapse, this may have increased the 
permeability of the backfilled trench area 
allowing water to collect in this area. 
Classification of the soils was based on the 
following tests: Atterberg limits, grain size 
analysis, natural water content, and unit weight 
tests. strength measurements were obtained from 
uniaxial compression tests. The foundation soils 
were found to be a clayey silt CL-ML in the top 40 
in. (1 m) tending to a low plasticity clay CL in 
a lower zone of 40 to 80 in. (1 to 2 m). The 
liquid limits of the soils, ranged from 16 to 40% 
while the plastic indexes were estimated to range 
from 1. 5 to 18%. Void ratios for the undisturbed 
samples varied between 0. 55 and o. 70. The natural 
water content ranged from 15% near the top of the 
soil column to 30% near the bottom of the column. 
The unconfined compressive strength of the soils 
in the upper 40 in. averaged 1060 psf (50 kPa). 
At a depth of about 8 0 in. ( 2 m) , a very stiff 
clay, difficult to auger through, was encountered 
in all of the six auger holes completed. Figure 
2 illustrates a cross-section of the building, its 
foundation soils and the estimated location of the 
exca.vation r~lative to the building. 
Existing Soils Information 
Since the foundations are relatively shallow and 
the strip footings located at a depth of 18 in. 
(457 mm), the USDA Soil Conservation Service soil 
survey of Tuscaloosa county (1981) was reviewed 
for additional information concerning the area's 
soils. This survey had been issued in August of 
1981, with the major field work being conducted 
from 1971 to 1979. Figure 3 below shows the 
general soil map for the area of the building 
collapse. As can be seen from Figure 3, the 
building is located at the contact of a soil type 
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Figure 2 Cross-section of co1lapse building site. 
identified as a number 2 and described in the soil 
survey as a Adaton silt loam. According to the 
soil survey, the Adaton series consists of deep, 
poorly drained, slowly permeable soils that formed 
in silty fluvial sediments. In addition, the soil 
survey provides information for planning land uses 
related to urban development such as building site 
ievelopment and engineering index properties. For 
building development, the Adaton soils were 
::lassified as being "severe" for building shallow 
excavations and dwe1lings without basements. This 
NaS primarily due to the soil's wetness and low 
strength. Figure 4 lists the engineering index 
properties of the Adaton soil series. It can be 
seen from Figure 4 that the basic engineering 
property tested confirmed the field test 
previously reported. 
WALYSIS 
~ site investigation immediate1y following the 
::ollapse found that the trench for the sewer line 
1ad been placed within 1 ft of the foundation. 
rhis was done due to the close proximity of the 
ouilding to an adjacent property line, where only 
. 6 ft ( 1. 8 m) strip of land was available for 
'lacement of the sewer line. Based on this 
inding, the excavation was in violation of 
.pplicable building codes, which require "that 
:xcavations for any purpose near structures should 
.ot extend within 1 ft (0.3 m) of the angle of 
·epose or natural slope of the soil under any 
1179 
footing unless the structure is first properly 
underpinned or protected against settlement" 
(Southern Standard Building Code, 1961). Based on 
the soil strength measurements obtained, coupled 
with the information provided in the USDA soil 
survey of the area, it is highly unlikely that the 
building's foundation soils would be able to 
support a 5 to 6 ft excavation within 1 ft of the 
foundation. To address this issue, the geological 
setting of the foundation soils, a bearing 
capacity analysis prior to the excavation, the 
probable collapse mechanism, and compliance with 
existing building codes are discussed. 
Geologic Considerations 
A significant feature of the soils in the 
Tuscaloosa area is the alluvial orJ.gJ.n of the 
unconsolidated terrace sediments deposited by the 
Black warrior River. A well known characteristic 
of alluvial deposits is the extreme vertical and 
horizontal heterogeneity of the soils. due to 
stream migration as well as flood water 
deposition. The USDA Soil Conservation survey, 
presented in Figure 3, shows that the building was 
constructed at the edge of a pod-like section of 
Adaton silt. However, soil sampling revealed that 
a majority of the building, ·particularly the 
section that collapse, was constructed over 
approximately 7 ft (2 .1 m) of Adaton silt. Other 
locations in the Tuscaloosa area in which the 
Adaton silt is found are primarily in stream 
Third International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
http://ICCHGE1984-2013.mst.edu
Figure 3 Soil conservation Service soil survey. 
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channels. This can be seen in Figure 3 where 
Adaton silt is located to the southeast of the 
building collapse area. 
The pod-like nature of this soil suggests that 
it was a low area where sediments collected over 
time. This low area may also have been part of an 
extended drainage system for receding flood waters 
but over time filled with sediment. As is typical 
of areas that accumulate sediment, the sediment 
tends to be silt, which is a highly erodible soil, 
along with some clays. The results of the 
Atterberg limits test indicate that the top 
portion of the foundation soils are a low 
plasticity silt that graded into a low plasticity 
clay. This would suggest that the foundation 
soils formed over a long period of time from 
surface erosion which would tend to collect more 
silty than clayey soils, as opposed to resulting 
directly from the receding flood waters. Since 
this area is topographically a low area, it would 
also tend to collect water. This was confirmE!d by 
field observations in which the auger holes 
encountered highly saturated soils in the lower 
portion of the auger holes. It appears that a 
stiff clay, located at a depth of about 7 ft 
(2m), trapped water above it. 
Bearing Capacity Analysis 
Although only limited strength data was obtained 
from the site, an attempt was made to estimate the 
bearing capacity of the foundation prior to the 
excavation and subsequent building collapse. To 
perform a bearing capacity analysis, an estimate 
of the soil strength was made. Based on the 
unconfined compression test of the upper 40 in. 
(0.1 m), the soil had an average unconfined 
compressive strength of 1060 psf (50 kPa), giving 
an undrained shear strength of 530 psf (25 kPa) 
assuming ~=o. However, the lower portion of the 
soil was not tested because undisturbed samples 
were not obtained. Based on field observation and 
.moisture content measurements, which ranged from 
25 to 30% for the soils in the 40 to 80 in. zone, 
it was assumed that the soil in this zone was 
relatively close to its liquid limit. According 
to Cassagrande (1932), soils near their liquid 
limit have an undrained shear strength of 
approximately 50 psf (2.4 kPa). This provides a 
conservative estimate of the undrained shear 
strength of the soil in the lower saturated soil. 
Using these estimates of shear strength for the 
1180 
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foundation soils, a bearing capacity analysis was 
conducted assuming a strip footing supported by a 
two-layer soil. A recently proposed semiempirical 
equation by Azam and Wang (1991) for determining 
the ultimate bearing capacity of a two-layer c-¢ 
soil was used in the analysis. The proposed 
bearing capacity equation is given as follows 
where 
q0 = ultimate bearing capacity of a strip footing 
over a two-layer soil; 
q, = ultimate bearing capacity of the footing 
supported by an infinitely thick top-layer 
soil, computed by the traditional bearing-
capacity equations using factors recommended 
by Vesic (1975); 
qb ultimate bearing capacity of the footing 
supported by an infinitely thick bottom-layer 
soil, computed by the same method as q,; 
m layer factor, which is o .17 -o. 2 3 for two-
layers of clay (use of the lower value is 
recommended if one clay layer is highly 
compressible); 
H1 = distance between the base of the strip 
footing and the top of the bottom layer; 
B = width of the strip footing. 
Azam and Wang analyzed four different layer 
combinations with one of the combinations a stiff 
clay underlain by a soft clay. While the 
overlying soil in this analysis cannot be 
classified as stiff, as compared to the properties 
of the soils tested by Azam and Wang, the analysis 
was used in hopes of providing a lower bound 
estimate of the bearing capacity of the foundation 
prior to the excavation. In addition, instead of 
computing the bearing capacity using factors 
recommended by Vesic (1975), a lower bound 
estimate of % and qb was made assuming a simple 
uniaxial stress field below the footing which 
gives %«o = 2c (Chen and McCarron, 1991). The 
resulting bearing capacities are as follows 
% = 1060 psf (51 kPa) 
~ = 100 psf (5 kPa) 
According to Azam and Wang's proposed equation, 
the ultimate bearing capacity of the strip footing 
over the two-layer soil is 
% = 495 psf (23 kPa) 
Since the estimated bearing load on the footing 
was 325 psf (16 kPa), the foundation had a safety 
factor of approximately 1.5 against bearing 
capacity failure. According to Vesic (1975), 
however, situations in which safety factors are 
less than 2.0 should be avoided. Consequently, 
l:he foundation was below a minimum recommended 
safety factor prior to excavation of the trench. 
rn addition, Vesic also recommends that "removal 
:~f existing overburden by scour or excavation 
sho~ld be given adequate consideration". It is 
ml~kely that this was contemplated at the time of 




Based on the above analysis and information 
gathered at the site, the most probable collapse 
mechanism was that once the trench was excavated, 
the bottom soil, which was highly saturated and 
possibly near its liquid limit, flowed into the 
trench, thus undermining the upper bearing soils 
and resulting in the collapse of the building. 
This may also account for the time lag that 
occurred between the completion of the trench and 
the collapse, which was about 1 hour. 
Azam and Wang also studied the plastic flow 
behavior of foundation soils using a finite 
element technique to gain insight into the 
progressive yielding of these soils. Their 
analysis of a stiff clay underlain by a weak clay 
revealed that the yield zone extends deep into the 
weaker bottom layer and that the yield pattern is 
typical of a punching shear of the top layer 
followed by a general shear failure of the bottom 
layer. Although the collapsed building's 
foundation soils were considerably weaker than 
those studied by Azam and Wang, it is possible 
that progressive yielding of the bottom soil also 
accounted not only for the collapse but also the 
time delay of the collapse. 
Building Codes 
According to the standard building code section on 
excavations, the excavation had been placed too 
close to the foundation since it was not at least 
1ft (0.3 m) from the angle of repose of the soil 
or from the natural slope of the soil. Since the 
"angle of repose" of a soil generally refers to a 
granular material in loosely packed state, the 
excavation angle would have to have been based on 
the natural angle of the soil. However, this is 
a difficult parameter to determine since the soils 
were a soft saturated silty clay. If it is 
assumed that the soils were at or close to their 
liquid limit, then the natural slope would be very 
low and would result in large distances required 
from the foundation for the excavation. Thus, the 
only possible solution for this excavation would 
have been to properly underpin or to prevent the 
bottom soils from flowing into the trench, both of 
which would have been difficult to complete given 
the limited space available as well as the cost 
involved. 
An additional consideration in the collapse is 
that although the contractor was in violation of 
existing codes for excavation, their prior 
experience with other' excavations in the 
Tuscaloosa area indicated that there should be no 
problem with the excavation, since they had 
excavated shallow trenches next to or near the 
foundation without resulting in a collapse of the 
trench. Therefore, no consideration was given to 
first testing the soils to determine if they were 
stable to excavate. In addition, the backhoe 
operator observed the lower soils in the trench 
slowly flowing into the trench but yet did not 
:consider the situation as dangerous. While 
·training of the operator was lacking in this case, 
information did exist from the USDA soil survey 
for this area that was readily obtainable and that 
would have indicated the possible dangers in 
excavating these soils. In addition, knowledge of 
the geologic origin of the soils in this area 
would also help alert operators to the occurrence 
of potentially difficult soils, since in this 
case, the alluvial nature of the soils should be 
relatively apparent given their location to the 
Blac~ warrior River. 
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CONCLUSION 
Conclusions concerning the building collapse can 
be summarized as follows: 
1. The building had an estimated bearing 
capacity SF ~ 1.5 prior to collpase. 
2. Bearing soils were found to be a low 
plasticity silty clay overlying a saturated 
low plasticity clay. 
3 • A trench was placed within 1 ft ( 0. 3 m) of 
the foundation and in violation of applicable 
building codes for excavations. 
4. Insufficient space was available between the 
foundation and an adjacent property to place 
the trench and meet existing codes for 
excavations. 
5. Collapse of the building is believed to have 
resulted from the lower saturated clay 
flowing into the trench, thus undercutting 
the overlying soil and causing a loss of 
bearing capacity. 
6. No investigation of soil conditions was made 
prior to the excavation nor were indications 
of imminent failure of the trench taken into 
consideration. 
7. Information from the USDA Soil Conservation 
Service soil survey showed that the building 
probably was located on difficult soils which 
may cause problems with excavations, 
especially near foundations. 
8. A significance of this collapse is that other 
structures in the Tuscaloosa area are also 
constructed on similar soils. Since 
information exists that can identify these 
types of soils, it can be used to help 
identify foundation soils that are 
potentially susceptible to collapse from 
adjacent shallow excavations. 
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